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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces and exemplifies a trade-off analysis of
safety and security properties in distributed systems. The
aim is to support analysis for real-time communication and
authentication building blocks in a wireless communication
scenario. By embedding an authentication scheme (TV-
HORS) into a real-time communication protocol for safety-
critical scenarios, we can rely on the protocol’s individual
safety and security properties. The resulting communica-
tion protocol satisfies selected safety and security proper-
ties, for deployment in safety-critical use-case scenarios with
security requirements. We look at handover situations in a
IEEE 802.11 wireless setup between mobile nodes and access
points. The trade-offs involve application-layer data good-
put, probability of completed handover, and protocol slots
per Access Point, to quantify the impact of security from
a low-layer communication perspective on the communica-
tion protocols. The results are obtained using the network
simulator ns-3.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.5 [Local and Wide-Area Networks]: Ethernet (e.g.,
CSMA/CD); C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Performance
attributes; I.6 [Simulation and Modeling]: Miscellaneous
Keywords
real-time protocol, wireless communication, authentication,
safety & security
1. INTRODUCTION
In many use-case scenarios, nodes exhibit mobility patterns
that require them to communicate wirelessly. When such
networked components communicate over wireless links, they
provide a broader attack surface for malicious nodes in gath-
ering information and executing security exploits. One chal-
lenge in enforcing security properties of a system is that
existing secure countermeasures might conflict with design
aspects of safety-critical systems. Distributed systems with
safety-critical requirements demand for reliable communi-
cation services with timely response, and service availabil-
ity. This is specified in the communication system via up-
per time bounds for message delivery and redundancy con-
cepts, and realized via messaging protocols satisfying worst-
case execution times, the selection of specifically certified
robust hardware components, amongst others. In resource-
constrained environments like embedded systems, deploying
wireless technologies, the contributors for time delay can be
distinguished as processing and transmission time. The lat-
ter is the evaluation focus of this paper.
With authentication, we refer to the procedure of ensur-
ing a node’s or message’s authenticity, i.e., verifying its ori-
gin. For messages, the necessary information carried for au-
thentication is referred to as message integrity code (MIC).
It has several practical applications, e.g., for access con-
trol to networks, authentication is a pre-requisite, or (re-
)authentication in handover situations of mobile nodes to a
different Access Point (AP). Those applications can have ad-
verse effects to meeting real-time requirements for commu-
nication. Messaging protocols for safety-critical application
domains are often required to disseminate state information
or alerts in a multicast fashion, with high probability for
message delivery. Here, receivers either have to authenti-
cate the AP wirelessly distributing the message, and—upon
establishing authenticity—implicitly trust the sending node,
or directly perform authentication on the origin sender.
1.1 The Safety & Security View
From a traditional point of view, a common approach dur-
ing design is the isolated study and validation of safety and
security properties. When embedding security features into
a safety case, the challenge is to identify conflicts caused
by the combined safe and secure design. But methodologies
used to either assess safety or security aspects are often not
adequate for a joint evaluation of safety and security interde-
pendencies. Methods for determining the security, and the
aim of increasing the assurance into a system, are usually
based on risk assessment approaches. The overall assump-
tions differ from the point of safety versus security. When es-
tablishing safety properties, usually a closed system design is
assumed, while security properties apply to open connected
systems. Besides the danger that the initial assumption of a
closed system might not be correct, the increased use of open
communication systems in safety-critical systems requires an
understanding of the mutual impact of safety and security
mechanisms. This allows to identify the trade-offs for system
design and configuration. Further, quantifying those trade-
offs enables more accurate reasoning about system proper-
ties, and integrating those findings for tool support. Authen-
tication as a security attribute is a system property, and ap-
propriate measures are required to quantitatively use them
together with stochastic simulation approaches for safety [7].
To allow discussion of synergy effects and cross-influences,
system designers need a methodology that jointly addresses
the analysis of safety and security properties. A list of pos-
sible conflict where security does not support the safety
case is shown in Table 1. With the focus on embedded
systems, platforms are resource constrained, e.g., in pro-
cessing power, and do often not include dedicated hardware
with security functionality to keep costs down. Tradition-
ally, to meet safety and availability requirements, systems
often use proprietary (custom-designed) components, while
the approach of deploying COTS components for security
functions is commonly accepted. Several impacts can be ob-
served. A positive impact, where security supports safety,
is that it prohibits unauthorized components on interfering
with system safety during operation. Negative impacts are
a) the introduction of additional components for authentica-
tion, those need to be included from a safety perspective, b)
higher traffic, e.g., required hand-shake procedures for au-
thentication, session updates, and c) increase in time delays,
e.g., during node handover. The goal is to have a common
evaluation of selected safety and security blocks for the pur-
pose of exchanging messages in a safety-critical system with
security requirements.
We provide a qualitative characterization of security and
safety impacts on wireless communication in embedded sys-
tems and resource-constrained environments for mission-critical
applications. The focus of our analysis is on providing quan-
titative results obtained from a stochastic simulation setup.
We are interested in simulating a worst-case scenarios with
saturated channels that will cause higher delays and retrans-
missions of our real-time protocol. For simulation we are us-
ing ns-3. Exemplary results are shown for the IEEE 802.11
4-way handshake [1] in comparison to TV-HORS [10].
The paper is outlined as follows: Section 1.3 describes a
use-case scenario for our network architecture. Section 2 dis-
cusses conflicts of safety and security for the case of wireless
communication, and summarizes the selected real-time pro-
tocol and authentication mechanisms (Sections 2.1 and 2.2).
Section 2.2.2 describes the signature scheme for efficient
multicast authentication called TV-HORS we compare to
WPA2. The analysis in Section 3 examplifies derived quan-
titative communication metrics.
1.2 Related Work
The authors of [7] discuss techniques for a quantitative,
model-based evaluation for dependable and secure systems.
They also look into approaches involving discrete event sim-
ulation like network simulation tools, and the need to quan-
tify system properties for security. The case of security as
a safety issues, and the need to combine safety and secu-
rity in safety-critical infrastructures of railways systems is
discussed in [9]. The paper shows the trend to integrate ex-
isting communication technologies into railway communica-
tion, and the challenge of diverging from traditionally closed
systems. The authors of [4] address the same problem as this
Table 1: Possible Conflicts for Safety & Security [3]
Safety Security
Timeliness Encryption and authentication
Limited resources Encryption and authentication
Redundancy Confidentiality
Closed trust model Open trust model
Continuous operation
through upgrades
Up-to-date security patches
Extensive use of pro-
prietary systems
Extensive use of COTS
paper, discussing the security impact on an existing safety
case. Their paper outlines a method for assessing the secu-
rity risks associated with an existing system such as a large-
scale critical infrastructure. There exist several approaches
and improvements for authentication based on one time sig-
natures. Besides the one applied by us [10], Chang et al.
propose improvements for efficient broadcast authentication
in wireless sensor networks [5]. An approach and tool for
modeling safety and security interdependencies via Boolean
logic Driven Markov Processes (BDMP) shows [8], follow-
ing the analysis method known from fault and attack trees.
For the selected real-time protocol from [6], that paper also
contains experimental measurement setups for IEEE 802.11.
1.3 Scenario
The use-case scenario for the assessment described in Sec-
tion 3 are metropolitan area networks (MANs), with a first-
hop wireless link from a mobile node to the infrastructure.
One example is the communication system for metropoli-
tan railways. In the selected communication setup, a mo-
bile node resembles a train cabin moving on railway tracks,
maintaining communication with a control station via APs
alongside the track. Communication requirements between
cabin and infrastructure include upper temporal bounds for
message delivery, and message resilience. The infrastructure
is based on IEEE 802.11 WLAN [1]. In such a setup, regular
handover occurs of the mobile node to APs in the perime-
ter. As the APs provide a public external surface for access,
protocol nodes need to authenticate.
2. SAFETY & SECURITY MECHANISMS
One trade-off in safety versus security for real-time com-
munication and authentication is the increase of required
resources for authentication. First, processing times might
delay the real-time protocol time schedule, up to violating
requirements of upper communication time bounds. Sec-
ond, authentication tasks cause interruption of communi-
cation service. Third, the authentication data overhead
can result in scalability problems, e.g, by the increase in
messaging (by redundancy in the time and information do-
main). Those issues can be categorized as a) concerns of
availability, i.e., readiness for service, and b) data integrity,
regarding data corruption, omission and delivery, and c) re-
liability regarding transmission. Based on those categories,
and the applied strategies for reliable communication, em-
bedding the selected authentication mechanism into our reli-
able real-time communication protocol leads to the following
trade-offs. The combined design provides authenticity, but
negatively affects:
• Bandwidth: The increase of message size negatively af-
fects any combination of a) the max. allowed application-
layer data, b) the available redundancy in time, i.e.,
the resilience degree of a message, c) information re-
dundancy (e.g., additional error detection or data du-
plication).
• Redundancy in Space: multiple communication links
also have to cope with interleaving authentication pro-
cedures to avoid interruption of service, introducing a
common cause fault.
Those two points affect the worst-case under which a system
is resilient to degrading conditions of communication over
unreliable wireless links. Taking a look at the trade-offs,
we can partially study them from a quantitative perspective
by detailing the wireless communication environment, tech-
nologies, and faults. This provides the basis to apply our
methodology of using a discrete event network simulator to
address those points in question.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) as a standardized mecha-
nism for node authentication has two main drawbacks: 1)
it requires a handshake Station–AP before continuing with
communication. While this ensures the attribute of secu-
rity (node authenticity), it severely lengthens the handover
procedure, which affects the readiness for service (availabil-
ity). Examples of quantitative comparison later in this paper
show that effect. Authentication schemes usually requires an
initial key exchange or initialization phase. For TV-HORS,
that is the case for the regular exchange of new keychains be-
tween mobile node and the APs. This causes considerable
data overhead during operation, and needs to be weighed
against other protocol advantages. The main benefit is that
the handover procedure to the next selected AP is limited to
association only. In the following we summarize the selected
real-time protocol TRC and the authentication mechanisms
WPA2 and TV-HORS.
2.1 Safety: TRC Protocol
The Timed Reliable Communication (TRC) protocol [6] is
specifically designed for operation over wireless links in safety-
critical scenarios. The protocol provides synchronous and
time-bounded communication for IEEE 802.11 compliant
devices that are Quality of Service (QoS) enabled, i.e., sup-
port IEEE 802.11e. The devices use the Distributed Coor-
dination Function (DCF) mode. The protocol design aims
at application with low bandwidth requirements. It en-
forces strict upper bounds on Worst Case Execution Times
(WCETs), for distribution of broadcast, multicast, and uni-
cast messages. Messages are assigned a criticality level,
parametrized based on the required probability of message
delivery, and realized as a bound on the maximum retrans-
missions of a message. The overall communication architec-
ture follows a centralized communication setup. The setup
uses the notation of a coordinator, with all communication
distributed via the coordinator. The coordinator maintains
the allocation of necessary communication resources among
its node set, and executes the communication schedule for
the nodes. The schedule uses communication rounds and
fixed node time slots. During a round, the coordinator polls
each node of the node set in a predetermined order. In each
time slot, the associated node is polled by the coordinator,
with the node sending a request back to the coordinator
(containing status information or a new message for distri-
bution), and the coordinator broadcasts to its node set. The
coordinator continually updates its view of whether a node
of the set has received a message or not.
The protocol is based on the assumption that an upper
bound exists on the number of consecutive message losses
for the target environment. If no status update is received
from a node (after a poll) for more than a specific number
of times, the coordinator considers that node to have left
the connected node set. Detectors executing in the nodes
and the coordinator timely decide on message omission (and
therefore, absent nodes), as well as nodes deviating from the
expected execution behavior.
The coordinator itself is a logical unit. For our purposes, this
coordination mechanism is replicated in the access points,
to coordinate the associated nodes. The assumption of the
backbone infrastructure is a fast wired network, e.g., a closed
system with a high-speed redundant fiber ring topology.
For coordination, any updates of AP node sets, messages
for wireless transmission, and delivered messages are dis-
tributed/collected over that backbone without considerable
loss or delay.
2.2 Security: Authentication Schemes
We here shortly outline WPA2 and TV-HORS.
2.2.1 WPA2
The Wi-Fi Protected Access II (WPA2) is an implementa-
tion of IEEE 802.11i merged into [1]. As part of a Robust
Security Network Association (RSNA) establishment, tem-
poral key exchange takes place by executing a key manage-
ment algorithm, as specified in Section 8.5.3 of [1]. That
protocol is called the 4-way handshake, and completes the
IEEE 802.11X authentication process, see Figure 1.
In detail, the supplicant (station or node) and the authen-
ticator (AP) can either use a Master Session Key (MSK) or
a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) to derive a Pairwise Master Key
(PMK). Creating a master session key as common secret,
the overall process involves the supplicant, the authenti-
cator, and optionally an authentication server for security
capability discovery and 802.1X conversations. Having the
PMK, the 4-way handshake protocol is executed for RSNA
establishment. This produces a Pairwise Transient Key and
Group Transient Key, subsequently shared by the supplicant
and authenticator for Unicasts and Multicasts, respectively.
QoS Management Frames. A handshake is executed us-
ing the EAPOL (Extensible Authentication Protocol over
LANs) frame type. As with the frame type for association
(management frame), QoS header information as initially
specified by IEEE 802.11e is applicable. It allows 4 different
Access Categories (AC) to be used in addition to the stan-
dard Distributed Coordination Function (DCF), indicating
Figure 1: A sample 4-way handshake [1], between a Station
(S) and the Access Point (A).
the level of priority for a frame. A recent amendment speci-
fies the prioritization of management frames [2]. It describes
the quality of the service management frame (QMF) service,
and is applicable to stations that provide QoS support. A
station provides a QMF policy, which allows that station to
selectively transmit management frames in other access cat-
egories than the one assigned to voice traffic (AC VO). This
shall improve the quality of service of other traffic streams.
In any case, a station will use access category AC VO for
transmission to stations that do not support the QMF ser-
vice.
2.2.2 TV-HORS
The multicast authentication scheme based on TV-HORS
[10] is a v-time signature scheme. It extends on One-Time
Signatures (OTS), to avoid excessive public key distribu-
tion, while providing tolerance to packet loss and being ro-
bust against malicious attacks. TV-HORS is a unidirec-
tional scheme; to be used by 2 nodes to authenticate each
other’s traffic, it has to be applied by both nodes separately.
A drawback of this scheme is its distribution of comparably
large public keys varying between 8 to 10KB [10] as part of
occurring initialization phases.
In the generic Time Valid-OTS scheme, a sender predefines
and announces a signature period, with its private/public
key assigned to that period. Messages sent within that pe-
riod are then signed and verified using that key pair. With
TV-HORS, one-way hash chains are used to link multiple
key pairs together, each in row only valid for a specific pe-
riod of time. This time is referred to as epoch, effectively
dividing a transmission session into epochs P . Each epoch is
assigned a key pair. A parameter v specifies the maximum
number of packets that can be signed in each epoch. The
scheme construction requires determining T∆, the duration
of an epoch P . Hence, a transmission session is bounded
by T∆P . A salt chain kj is constructed, and based on that,
light chains are created. The elements si of those light chains
are referred to as Signature Authentic Generation Element
(SAGE). For each new transmission session, a sender has to
send initialization information to its receivers.
Combining Properties. Table 2 summarizes the individual
safety and security properties of TV-HORS and TRC. The
third property of Table 2, integrity, states for TV-HORS to
detect intentional modification. But it is a weak property
for TRC, being able to only detect unintentional/accidental
modifications using CRC.
Looking at the protocols in isolation, one could either con-
duct 1) a dedicated analysis of TV-HORS with respect to
satisfying properties for real-time communication, or 2) es-
tablishing claims about the TRC protocol executing in con-
cordance to communication technology-dependent authen-
tication mechanisms. Both of those approaches would ei-
ther require strong assumptions on the underlying commu-
nication primitives in term of reliability and timeliness, or
lead to rather qualitative results. Taking advantage of the
case where security supports safety, we can by a straight-
forward modification embed TV-HORS in the real-time pro-
tocol. The TV-HORS signature for a packet is applied to
any packet sent by the TRC protocol. This is done by both
the TRC coordinator as well as the TRC node set. The
TV-HORS initialization information for a new transmission
session is also distributed as part of a TRC message. To
preserve a deterministic packet size, a fixed amount of the
application service data unit of a packet is reserved, to hold
(part of) the initialization information. Therefore, sending
the initialization information is treated as any other safety-
critical message. Now, the same message resilience degree
applies as for safety-critical messages, as well as the WCET
guarantee. Drawback is the static overhead of the reserved
buffer per message.
A coordinator in the AP receiving part of a node’s initializa-
tion information, will publish that information to the back-
bone infrastructure, so that subsequent APs that node is
communicating with can use it in the new transmission ses-
sion. Based on our use-case scenario, we can exploit the
architecture properties of the communication system. We
assume for the purpose of this paper is, that the APs wired
backbone is fast and reliable to allow efficient replication the
initialization information to subsequent track-side APs.
Summarizing, embedding TV-HORS as part of the regular
TRC message exchange affects:
• TV-HORS data overhead decreases the size of the Ap-
plication Service Data Unit (ASDU)
• TV-HORS message exchange follows real-time proto-
col message schedule
• Node handover requires IEEE 802.11 association only
3. ANALYSIS
Using the real-time protocol and authentication mechanisms
described in Section 2, this sections shows exemplary results
of applying a set of metrics to the combined communication
model, and further compare the real-time and authentica-
tion trade-off from a stochastic network simulation perspec-
tive. Of particular interest is the high cross-traffic scenario
(close to saturation throughput), and single link setup. We
Table 3: Communication Parameters and Simulation Settings
Parameter Setting Description
Slot size 15 ms The slot size allocated by the real-time protocol to a single node per round
Protocol nodes 5 Real-time protocol nodes per AP
Interfering nodes 8 total, 2 per AP Compete for channel access, with traffic simulating saturation throughput
AP distance 200 m Distance between 2 APs
IEEE 802.11b DCF 2 Mbit/s DQPSK Robust coding scheme, and good reception at longer distances
Simulation Runs 240 Sequence of independent trials of the simulation
Table 2: Properties of TV-HORS and TRC
Property TV-HORS TRC
Integrity yes CRC
Total Ordering no no
Reliability for msg delivery no yes
Broadcast yes yes
Multicast yes yes
Unicast yes yes
Authenticity yes no
neglect processing times for e.g., frame processing, cyclic
redundancy checks (CRC), and hash calculation.
We include the following results: the first part shows node
handover with authentication to the AP based on WPA2.
The algorithms for creating and using a RSNA are specified
in IEEE 802.11. The essential part required for any of the
four possible ways to use a RSNA is to establish temporal
keys by executing a key management algorithm. During
handover, service interruption on that particular link for
TRC protocol execution occurs, and allocated protocol slots
for a node might be lost.
The second part shows the impact of TV-HORS exchanging
its initialization information for subsequent authentication.
The last part shows the trade-off for application-layer good-
put based on the selected parametrization for moving train
at different speeds.
3.1 Simulation Support
For safety-critical tasks and strict real-time requirements,
stochastic simulation and measurement-based approaches can
aid as support to formal analyses for e.g., temporal bounds
as WCETs or bounds on resource allocation. A commu-
nication stack implementing the specification according to
IEEE 802.11 offers a wide range of parameterization. Us-
ing an analytical model can usually not capture the whole
parameter space, but limits itself to a small subset thereof.
Here, modelling an evaluation setup in a network simulation
environment has the advantage of a more thorough approxi-
mation to the specification. It provides first-hand evaluation
possibilities of protocol modifications, with an insight on ex-
pected performance and the tightness of bounds as derived
using e.g., analytical WCET tools. Simulation models fur-
ther offer the possibility to conduct repeatable experiments
for protocol modifications and altered parameter settings in
the exact same environment conditions. This is mostly not
possible with experimental measurements in a field setup.
Network simulation models allow the generation of lower
layer results for further evaluation of characteristics of com-
munication networks. A common characteristic is the obser-
vation of long tails in delays. Using simulation experiments,
we can fit delay curves to long tail distributions, to better es-
timate protocol scheduling. It is one probabilistic approach
for quantification of safety/security trade-off. For the re-
sults from our experiments, we use a Pareto distribution for
fitting the tails of delays.
3.1.1 Mobility Model
The mobility model is created with respect to one moving
node describing a coach. The node moves along a given path
resembling a railway track with constant speed. The access
points are stationary at a-priori known positions along the
railway track. The interfering stations serve the purpose to
saturate the channel along the path of the mobile node, and
therefore approximate a highly contended link with concur-
rent access to the channel resource. From a practical point
of view, such cross-traffic could occur—whether intentional
or unintentional—near train station platforms or by passen-
ger equipment within a coach. See Figure 2 for a graphical
description of the simulated layout in its initial state, and
Table 3 for details on parameterization.
Figure 2: Map of stationary APs (red), initial locations of
interfering nodes (circles show association), and path of the
mobile node (orange).
3.2 WPA2
Figure 3 shows the delay contribution of the first 500 ms of
the 4-Way handshake for creating and sharing the pairwise
and group transient keys between the selected AP and the
mobile node. Because the handover procedure is executed
independent of the real-time protocol’s slotting schedule, the
effect on protocol time slots is of interest. The possible neg-
ative impact of low QoS management frame settings on the
handshake is shown in Figure 3. This indicates that frame
prioritization of real-time protocol frames and management
frames should be aligned (preferably using AC VO). Using
the slot metric, Figures 4a and 4b shows the lost time slots
of a node caused by its handover. Here, the loss is a metric
of the interruption of communication service of that node,
and shows the negative impact on the message resilience
degree. Lost slots are not applicable for message retrans-
mission. The negative impact is for one the decrease in
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Figure 3: 4-way handshake delay contribution showing de-
lays ≤ 500 ms (normalized) in saturated channel environ-
ment.
resilience for message requests (missed poll) or message re-
ception from other nodes (missed broadcast). As expected,
the consecutive loss of Figure 4b is higher due to the AC BK
frame type. The results are based on the same experiments
as Figure 3.
Initiating the 4-way handshake can be improved by aligning
it to the TRC protocol schedule. In defining a broadcast set
Sbc, strictly the sender s is part of Sbc, s ∈ Sbc for message
delivery. This can usually be relaxed, as s does not have to
receive its own broadcasted message. Therefore, for a node
to not miss its own slot due to handover, a handover should
take place after s finished its outgoing messaging with the
coordinator in its assigned slot. Broadcasts of subsequent
scheduled nodes might be missed, but the time of all remain-
ing slots of {Sbc − s} is available to complete the handover
of s, sacrificing its own time slot with the least probability.
This follows from the probability as obtained by the curve
fitted to the tails. Scheduling the handover that way, i.e.,
authentication and association, requires slight modification
on the station trigger mechanism for initiating the IEEE
802.11 handover. It involves storing the decision obtained
after the latest station’s probe request timeout. That de-
cision is executed on finishing s’ slot, i.e., after sending its
request message to the coordinator. Applying that modifi-
cation in ns-3 also supports that statement.
3.3 TV-HORS
In contrast to the results shown for WPA2, no additional
handshake is necessary with TV-HORS. A handover simpli-
fies to a node association to the selected AP. Figure 5 shows
the delays for association only.
Applying the parameterization as shown in Table 4, a com-
munication overhead of 80 Bytes is required per message to
carry the required scheme information. It can be calculated
as |si|t + |kj |+ |a|+ |c|. The variable c denotes the current
epoch, and a refers to the ath message to be sent in that
epoch. This overhead directly impacts the available size of
the application service data unit for a sender. As described
for the TV-HORS scheme, every new transmission session
requires in advance the exchange of commitment values be-
tween a sender and receiver, the initialization information.
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Figure 4: Lost node slots caused by WPA2 handover, distin-
guished by lost TRC poll and broadcast packets. Slot loss
is a negative impact on the TRC message resilience degree.
The size of that initialization information distributed by the
sender consist of 〈k0, Nsi, T∆, tS0 , P 〉. The variable tS0 holds
a timestamp referring to the beginning of the signature pe-
riod, and is assumed 8 Bytes long. The information size re-
quired to be transmitted to a receiver (based on Table 4), is
calculated allocating 9526 Bytes. Of interest in the trade-off
analysis is the impact of transmitting that initialization in-
formation, also containing the sender’s generated key. That
initialization information is distributed as part of the execut-
ing real-time protocol. This is important, because now the
same message resilience degree applies as for the distributed
safety-critical messages.
Taking a typical maximum message of 200 Bytes, and ac-
counting 80 Bytes for the signature, we permit additional
20 Bytes to transmitting part of the generated initializa-
tion information, leaving a remaining size of 80 Bytes to
the application. The result in Figure 6 shows the transmis-
sion delays for the initialization information for TV-HORS
to receivers, until the complete information was received.
3.4 Application-layer Goodput
One metric from application-layer perspective is the impact
of authentication on the TRC protocol, and in consequence,
on the number of messages that are transmitted. For a fair
comparison in terms of packet size, we configure the setup to
always use the same ASDU length, taking into account the
Table 4: TV-HORS Settings
Parameter Setting Description
Salt Chain
Element kj
80 Bits The size of 1 salt chain element
SAGE si 48 Bits The size of 1 light chain element
v 9 Max. Numbers of packets
signed in one epoch
N 1584 The total number of SAGE
chains
t 11 Number of SAGEs contained in
a message signature
Tx Session 3600 s The duration of a transmission
session
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Figure 5: Node association time delay with Pareto-fitted tail
(normalized).
size of the MIC (8 Bytes) and the TV-HORS signature data.
This allows the same assumptions on packet loss probability
from bit errors. But it leads to a deterministic decrease
in application-layer data for TV-HORS due to its bigger
signature. An alternative approach would be to explicitly
account for different packet sizes in the setup.
Figure 7 shows the expected minimum application-layer good-
put from the TRC protocol for different train speeds. The
handover is included via its delay and the probability PHO
that handover completed within the timing bounds of the
real-time protocol. Figure 7 shows this for PHO = 0.95 and
PHO = 0.99 of the Pareto curve fit. For PHO = 0.99, the
result for WPA2 with best-effort frames is omitted, because
the handover exceeds the TRC protocol WCET. The cause
of that effect can also be seen in the histogram of Figure 4b
and its high consecutive slot loss. For example, taking a
message resilience degree of 10 to configure the protocol, we
would get a maximum detection time for node disconnect
of (slot ∗ nodes ∗ 10 + slot) = 765 ms, using Table 3. The
probability that handover is not completed at that point is
≈ 0.0072 for AC VO, but still ≈ 0.174 for AC BK. To gap
those long delays, a higher resilience degree and/or longer
slots are necessary.
While TV-HORS comes with the initial disadvantage of lower
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Figure 6: Transmission delay until TV-HORS initialization
information is complete at the receiver.
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Figure 7: Impact of handover (association only, or with au-
thentication) on TRC protocol goodput.
goodput (caused by the additionally transmitted signature),
the additional impact by increasing speed is the lowest. In
addition, it has the lowest increase in handover delays for
PHO with (PHO > 0.99). The goodput is calculated based
on applicable slots per associated AP, and using the aver-
aged simulation result for packet retransmission by the TRC
protocol. That gives the application-layer goodput for exe-
cuting the TRC protocol for message exchange.
As discussed in Section 2.1, the TRC protocol uses a slotted,
round-based schedule. Figure 8 shows the available average
number of slots per AP for a single node executing the TRC
protocol. This is a protocol specific metric, with the impact
from associated times per AP at different speeds.
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In theory, a methodology for combining safety and security
properties might apply an analytical approach, where com-
munication is formalized solely on deterministic initial con-
ditions, variables are bounded, and communication behavior
is modeled following cause and effect.
With distributed systems using wireless networks and de-
ploying standardized communication technologies and COTS
components, the underlying techniques, e.g., CSMA/CA with
backoff, and characteristics of communication networks, e.g.,
long tails in communication delays, do not necessarily sup-
port such approach. Instead, a quantification based on a
probabilistic modeling can aid in analyzing the trade-offs
in safety and security. A parametrization using stochastic
methods and discrete event network simulations can provide
a useful starting point for analysis.
For our analysis, we discuss trade-offs for communication
aspects when facing both safety and security requirements
in the design of safety-critical systems. We use a real-time
protocol for distribution of safety-critical messages to assess
required procedures in node handover. The real-time proto-
col’s slot metric is an important configuration factor in pa-
rameterization for channel contention, with direct influence
on message resilience degree and protocol WCET. It also
impacts the number of slot misses in handover due to au-
thentication, and delays for distributing TV-HORS initial-
ization information. Besides the WPA2 4-way handshake,
we applied the one-time signature authentication scheme
TV-HORS to our analysis. TV-HORS can simplify node
handover, with the AP directly verifying signatures. This
leads to a more efficient and robust handover; the downside
is transmission of large initialization information for each
new transmission session. For deterministic packet sizes,
this considerably affects the maximum size of the applica-
tion service data unit. Selecting a sensible ratio of message
versus TV-HORS initialization information depends on the
application traffic model.
By embedding the authentication mechanism into the real-
time protocol so both the safety and security properties hold,
we establish metrics to evaluate where security has a neg-
ative impact on safety. Metrics include handover and au-
thentication delays, missed node slots in the protocol sched-
ule, and application-layer goodput for real-time messaging.
This provides one step in the convergence of joint modeling
safety and security attributes. We can focus on communi-
cation specifics and the deployed communication technol-
ogy, to quantitatively compare selected metrics as measure
for throughput, loss, and delay. Our setup and mobility
model resembles a metropolitan railway communication ar-
chitecture deploying IEEE 802.11. Using ns-3 to prototype
the communication and authentication protocols, we imple-
mented the metrics of choice in the required simulation mod-
els.
The results of such approach aid in establishing more com-
plex probabilistic models for combined safety and security
modeling.
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